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Abstract
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and chooses whether to accept delivery, are often used to solve hold-up problems. We present
a simple game that focusses sharply on subgames in which the buyer proposes ineﬃcient
actions in order to improve his bargaining position. We argue for one of several alternative
ways to model this situation. We then apply that modeling choice to recent models of the
foundations of incomplete contracts and show that a buyer option contract is suﬃcient to
induce ﬁrst-best outcomes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years a large literature has emerged dealing with the hold-up problem, in which
parties to a contract fail to invest adequately in the relationship for fear of opportunistic
renegotiation by their partners. Much of the inspiration for this literature (reviewed in
Tirole [1999]) comes from the work of Oliver Williamson (e.g., Williamson [1985]), and has
tried to formalize his idea that the protection of relationship-speciﬁc investments lies behind
much of what we see in contracts and industrial organization. The formal literature has
swung back and forth between papers arguing that the hold-up problem is unavoidable and
papers with clever contractual solutions to the problem. The literature begins with Hart
and Moore’s (1988) argument for the unavoidability of hold-up, which was answered by
N¨ oldeke and Schmidt’s (1995) presentation of option contracts as a solution to the problem
and by Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey’s (1994) more general analysis of renegotiation design.
Several papers have presented conditions under which contracting, including the use of
option contracts, seems to be useless if renegotiation cannot be prevented. In particular,
Che and Hausch (1999), Segal (1999), and Hart and Moore (1999) all present models in
which contracts can achieve nothing more than the “null” contract of no contract at all, so
that contracts are inherently incomplete. If the parties could commit not to renegotiate the
contract, they could be induced to invest eﬃciently in the contractual relationship. Such
commitment, however, is typically impossible, and the parties will renegotiate the contract
based on information they obtain after the contract is signed. One party may threaten
ineﬃcient contract performance (or non-performance) in order to strengthen his bargaining
position in the ensuing renegotiation. Anticipating such a threat, the other party will be
unwilling to invest eﬃciently in the trading relationship.
We argue that buyer-option contracts can solve many of these apparent hold-up prob-
lems. In analyzing such contracts, however, the timing of moves and the details of the game’s
structure are very important. It is easy to confuse “having all the bargaining power” with
the ability to take a unilateral action, and to confuse outside options with actions that shift
the status quo point of a bargaining game. Our goal in this article is to distinguish clearly
between alternative ways of modeling buyer-option contracts and to explore what these dis-
tinctions imply for models of incomplete contracts and the hold-up problem. In particular,
we show that option contracts undermine the credibility of ineﬃcient threats and thereby
restore eﬃciency even when the buyer has all the bargaining power. We apply our analysis
to two models of the foundations of incomplete contracts, showing that properly speciﬁed
buyer-option contracts are suﬃcient to attain the ﬁrst best.
Our focus on the details of the contracting process and timing is in the same spiritLyon and Rasmusen 2
as in Watson (2003). Both papers argue that the “reduced form” modeling approach of
mechanism design can be misleading when applied without regard to the speciﬁc circum-
stances of the setting being modeled. The papers diﬀer greatly in approach, however, our
focus being on the “buyer-option” contract and its performance while Watson’s analysis
is more abstract. Watson (2003) criticizes the “mechanism design with ex post renegoti-
ation” (MDER) approach developed by Maskin and Moore (1999) as being incompatible
with sensible extensive forms and eﬀectively slipping in contractual incompleteness as an
assumption. His purpose is to integrate speciﬁcs of the order of play into mechanism design
and thus disclose which orders of play do not ﬁt the situations being modeled. Though
the ﬂavor of his point is the same as ours, his approach and style are quite diﬀerent—more
technical, and in the style of general mechanism design rather than investigating particular
settings and contracts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple game that
distinguishes sharply between bargaining power and the ability to make credible threats and
discusses three ways to model the game. Section 3 illustrates how Section 2’s distinctions
apply in the context of nuisance suits and strategic choice of legal remedies. Section 4
applies our analysis to two prominent models of incomplete contracts, and argues that
the bleak conclusions these models reach are overturned through the use of buyer-option
contracts, though Section 5 shows that adding incomplete information to the model reduces
the attractiveness of buyer-options contract. Section 6 concludes.
2. ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF UNILATERAL ACTION
In this section we present a simple game that allows us to distinguish clearly between
bargaining power and the ability to make credible threats. To place matters in sharpest
relief, we focus on the case where just one player has the potential to hold up the other
player opportunistically and that same player has all the bargaining power. The hold-up
problem is especially severe when the opportunistic player has more bargaining power, so
this is a natural starting point for seeing whether contracts can avoid the hold-up problem.
If contracts can head oﬀ opportunism here, they can also do it if bargaining power is more
equal.
What does it mean for one of the players in a game “to have all the bargaining power”?
Economists normally use the phrase to mean that one player wins the entire surplus in the
equilibrium of a reduced-form bargaining game. Suppose two players are splitting a “pie”
of size 1, and if they both agree to the split (s,1 − s), that is what each receives, but if
they disagree, each gets a payoﬀ of 0. The economic deﬁnition of player 1 “having all theLyon and Rasmusen 3
bargaining power” is that s = 1; he gets the entire surplus.
A simple way to model this, which by now is standard, is to model bargaining as a game
in which player 1 gets to make a take-it-or-leave- it oﬀer. Thus, the game is
1. Player 1 oﬀers a contract consisting of the split (s,1 − s).
2. Player 2 accepts or rejects the contract.
3. If player 2 accepts, the payoﬀs are (s,1 − s), and if he rejects they are (0,0).
The only subgame perfect equilibrium of this game has player 1 oﬀering s = 1 and
player 2 accepting any oﬀer s ≤ 1. This is easily adapted to become a model of equal
bargaining power if we add an initial chance move that determines which player gets to
make the take-it-or- leave-it oﬀer, with equal probabilities.
An advantage of economic theory over looser thinking about bargaining is that this def-
inition of bargaining power distinguishes strong bargaining power from a strong bargaining
position. Consider the following example:
Bargaining Power Game: John is selling Mary a car. John values the car at $2,000, its
market price. Mary, however, values the car at $22,000 because she likes that car and does
not know where to ﬁnd a good substitute. On the other hand, Mary is a patient and skilled
bargainer, and always takes 90 percent of the surplus in her bargains with John. Thus, the
price they agree upon is $4,000.
In common language, people would have a hard time deciding whether to say Mary
had weak or strong bargaining power. Economists, however, would say that Mary is in
a weak bargaining position, but she has strong bargaining power. This is a distinction
of great value. Despite Nash (1952) and Rubinstein (1982), we are still uncomfortable
in saying that there is a unique solution to simple pie-splitting games. We are much more
comfortable in specifying the size of the pie, which is simply a function of tastes, technology,
and past actions of the players. Thus, we often make reduced-form assumptions about a
player’s bargaining power in a way that we do not make them about a player’s bargaining
position. It is dangerous to move beyond assumptions that concern how surplus is split— a
zero-sum activity—to assumptions that restrict real actions. Allowing a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer is perilously close to allowing any threat whatsoever to be credible, but we make the
assumption in bargaining games as a simplifying assumption that we do not think is critical
to the outcome.
Bargaining has many more complexities than this, of course, but it provides a good
starting point for analyzing them. The idea of “bargaining position”, for example, involvesLyon and Rasmusen 4
both the status quo and the outside options players have, as Sutton (1986) points out.1
Even a small shift in the status quo point aﬀects the bargaining outcome if there are no
alternatives to dealing with each other , but if there are, it may be those alternatives that
determine the threat point. For our present purposes, such subtleties do not matter. Rather,
we have laid out this simplest of bargaining models to contrast it with the situation in the
contracting models we will next analyze, in which one player has a unilateral option that
aﬀects the payoﬀs of both players. In later sections we will make the option more speciﬁc in
the context of particular models, but for now let us analyze a generic version of the situation
that we will call “The Basic Game.”
The Basic Game. If action A is chosen by time T , then player 1 receives amount a1
and player 2 receives amount a2, with a1 > 0,a2 > 0, and a1 + a2 = 1. If action A is
not chosen by time T, both players receive zero. Whether action A is taken is under
the control of player 1. The two players are bargaining over how to split the surplus
from action A being taken, and Player 1 has all the bargaining power.
The element that distinguishes the Basic Game from a typical pie- splitting game is
action A, which is under the unilateral control of player 1. The game as we have described
it may seem rather abstract. This is intentional, as we are interested in applying this general
game structure to several diﬀerent settings. However, a concrete example might be useful
ﬁrst.
The Suicide Bomber Game. At the close of contract negotiations between Players 1
and 2, Player 1 pulls out a bomb, cradles it in his arms, and turns the switch from “No
explosion” to “Explode in 5 minutes.” He then tells Player 2, “Unless you give me an
extra $10,000, I will let the bomb blow the two of us to smithereens. I know you value
your life at exactly $10,000 (compared to the mere $9,000 value I place on my own life),
1Sutton (1986) uses the context of an inﬁnite-horizon bargaining game. He presents a simple alternating-
oﬀers bargaining game in which Player II has an “outside option” with value s2 that is always available. If
the players have equal bargaining power (which means equal discount factors in the Sutton model), then
Player I receives min{1/2,1 − s2}. As Sutton puts it (p. 714) “[E]ither Player II’s option exceeds what he
would have obtained in the original game, in which case Player I needs to oﬀer (marginally more than) s2
to “buy him oﬀ”; or else it does not—in which case the threat of having recourse to the outside option is
empty, and it has no eﬀect on the outcome.” Sutton’s conclusion about the outside option is similar to our
conclusion about Action A: a threat to make oneself worse oﬀ is not a credible threat.Lyon and Rasmusen 5
and since I am a very good bargainer, I know you will pay me the full $10,000 to save
your life. Pay up or die.”
In this example, Action A is for Player 1 to turn the switch back to “No explosion.”
Player 1 controls Action A—he can unilaterally stop the bomb from exploding at any time,
by twisting back the lever to “No Explosion.” The issue with which we will be concerned
is how, if at all, the bomber’s threat should be considered to alter the bargaining process
over the contract. In particular, can the bomber use the threat to extort a larger share of
the surplus for himself? Or is the bomb threat irrelevant to the contract negotiations?
How should the Basic Game be modeled? Should action A be modelled as just one more
element of player 1’s proposal to player 2? (Model 1 below) Or should it be possible for
player 1 to take action A anyway if player 2 rejects his take-it-or- leave-it oﬀer? (Model 2)
Or, since player 2’s acceptance or rejection is supposed to be the last move in the bargaining
subgame, should his decision to accept or reject be simultaneous with player 1’s ultimate
decision about action A? (Model 3)
We will present structured analyses of each of these alternatives using the notation
(X;s,1 − s), where X ∈ {A,} indicates that either Action A is taken or no action () is
taken, and (s,1 − s) indicates each player’s share of the surplus. We will assume Player 1
has all the bargaining power and represent bargaining as taking place via one take-it- or-
leave-it oﬀer by Player 1 to Player 2 with no time discounting. This allows us to represent
the alternative models as simple extensive-form games and does not sacriﬁce generality with
regard to the timing of the bargaining process, since all that matters is the ﬁnal oﬀer.2
Our interest is in how the timing of the bargaining process interacts with Player 1’s
opportunity to exercise his unilateral option on Action A. There are three relevant dates
for our purposes: the date on which the ﬁnal decision on Action A must be made (T), the
last date on which the Player 2 can respond to a bargaining oﬀer (which we will call t∗∗),
and the last date on which Player 1 can make a bargaining oﬀer (which we will call t∗). By
deﬁnition, it must be that t∗ < t∗∗ ≤ T. A key diﬀerence between the models below will
be that in Model 2, t∗∗ < T, while in Models 1 and 3, t∗∗ = T.
Model 1 (see Figure 1)
2See, e.g., Chapter 12 of Rasmusen [2001]. If time discounting is unimportant, the sequence of oﬀers and
replies before the ﬁnal oﬀer and reply is irrelevant, as is whether they occur in continuous or discrete time.
The sequence could be alternating oﬀers by the two players with Player 1 going last, three oﬀers by Player
1, or even 200 oﬀers by Player 2 followed by one oﬀer by Player 1; in each case Player 1 would have all the
bargaining power since he gets to make a ﬁnal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer.Lyon and Rasmusen 6
1. At time t∗, Player 1 oﬀers a proposal saying that he authorizes action A if player 2
agrees to the split (s,1 − s).
2. At time t∗∗ = T, Player 2 accepts or rejects the proposal.
3. If player 2 accepts, the payoﬀs are (s,1−s) and action A occurs. If he rejects, action
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Figure 1: The Structure of Model 1
The unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in Model 1 is that Player 1 proposes the split
(1,0), Player 2 accepts any s ≤ 1, and action A is taken.
Model 2 (see Figure 2)
1. At time t∗, Player 1 oﬀers a proposal saying that he authorizes action A if Player 2
agrees to the split (s,1 − s).
2. At time t∗∗ < T, Player 2 accepts or rejects the proposal. If he accepts, the payoﬀs
are (s,1 − s) and action A occurs.
3. If Player 2 rejects the proposal, then at time T Player 1 chooses whether to unilaterally
authorize action A. If he does, the payoﬀs are (a1, a2), and otherwise they are (0,0).
There is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome in Model 2: action A is taken
and the split is (a1, a2). A continuum of subgame-perfect equilibria support this outcome.
Player 1 proposes any split with 1−s ≤ a2, and he authorizes action A unilaterally if Player
2 rejects the proposal. Player 2 accepts any oﬀer with 1 − s ≥ a2, and rejects otherwise.
This is the equilibrium because if Player 1 oﬀers split (s,1 − s) with 1 − s < a2, then
Player 2 rejects the oﬀer but Player 1 nevertheless takes action A. If Player 1 oﬀers split
(a1,a2), then Player 2 is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting Player 1’s oﬀer, but



































Figure 2: The Structure of Model 2
Model 3 (See Figure 3)
1. At time t∗, Player 1 oﬀers a proposal saying that he authorizes action A if Player 2
agrees to the split (s,1 − s).
2. At time t∗∗ = T, two things happen simultaneously: (a) Player 2 accepts or rejects
the contract, and (b) Player 1 chooses whether to unilaterally authorize action A or
not.
3. If Player 2 has agreed to the contract, the payoﬀs are (s,1 − s) and action A occurs
(even if A was not independently authorized by Player 1). If Player 2 rejected the
contract, then payoﬀs are (0, 0) unless Player 1 authorized A, in which case the payoﬀs
are (a1, a2 ).
Model 3 has two subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes. In equilibria of type 3A, the
equilibrium outcome split is (a1,a2), Player 2 rejects Player 1’s oﬀer if it yields him less
than a2, and Player 1 authorizes action A in move 3 even if it was not part of the proposal
in Move 1. Player 1’s equilibrium strategy is to make any oﬀer with (1 − s) ≤ a2 and to
authorize action A at time T regardless of whether the oﬀer is accepted; Player 2 accepts
any oﬀer with (1 − s) ≥ a2 and rejects otherwise.
In the unique equilibrium of type 3B, the split is (1, 0), Player 2 accepts Player 1’s
oﬀer of that split and authorization of action A, and Player 1 does not independently (andLyon and Rasmusen 8
redundantly) authorize A in move 3. Player 1’s equilibrium strategy is to oﬀer 1 − s = 0
and not to authorize action A at time T; Player 2’s strategy is to accept any oﬀer with




























































Figure 3: The Structure of Model 3
2.1 DISCUSSION OF THE MODELS
The attraction of Model 1 is that it preserves the simple idea that “all the bargaining
power” means to be able to make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. However complicated the terms
of the proposal may be, the modeler simply treats it as an indivisible unit and gives the
weaker player the option only to accept or reject. Any alternative proposals or tentative
actions before the last possible date of agreement are irrelevant, and by deﬁnition the players
cannot take any actions after that date.
Model 1 is implicitly used in models of mechanism design with ex post renegotiation.
There, the typical sequence of events is: 1. Contracting, 2. Investment, 3. Arrival of in-
formation, 4. A message game, 5. Renegotiation, and 6. Outcomes. Our “Basic Game”
can be interpreted as including steps 4, 5, and 6, the play of the mechanism and the rene-
gotiation. Player 1 sends a veriﬁable message to the court in response to some unveriﬁable
event that he and Player 2 observe, and the court—which acts as the mechanism—carries
out the terms of the agreement based on that message and on observable actions of the
two players such as whether they accept delivery of a good. Renegotiation consists of both
players agreeing to change the outcome after Player 1 sends a message that would result in
ineﬃciency under the terms of the original mechanism. Model 1 implies that Player 1 mayLyon and Rasmusen 9
have an incentive to send an ineﬃcient message (“I will refuse to take action A unless you
agree to the split (1,0).”) so as to initiate a renegotiation game in which he can capture all
the surplus.3
We argue, however, that Model 2 is a better modeling choice. In Model 1, Player 1 is
using a non-credible threat in eﬀect, because action A is under his sole control, a unilateral
decision. This is in contrast with splitting a surplus, a bilateral decision to which both
players must agree or the surplus is lost.
Recall the Suicide Bomber Game. Is Player 1’s threat to detonate the bomb credible?
No, not even if we say that he has all the bargaining power, unless by “have all the bargaining
power” we are imposing conditions on what moves are allowed in a game. The problem
is that Player 1 controls Action A all by himself. He can unilaterally stop the bomb from
exploding, by twisting back the lever to “No Explosion,” even if Player 2 refuses to pay
the $10,000. If a player can unilaterally withdraw a threatened action, and can increase
his payoﬀ by doing so, then we should expect him to withdraw it. This is what we usually
mean by “a non-credible threat”. If the threatened player refuses to be intimidated, the
threatening player will bear a cost if he carries out his threat, and since carrying out the
threat is entirely under his control, he will not do it. His bluﬀ will be called.4
In light of the foregoing discussion, we argue that any reasonable model of the Basic
Game must conform to what we will call the “axiom of unilateral action,” an axiom that
rules out Model 1.
Axiom of Unilateral Action: In the Basic Game, Player 1 must have the option to make his
decision on Action A unilaterally at any time up to and including time T.
The axiom does not distinguish between Models 2 and 3, which both satisfy it. The
diﬀerence between them is that in Model 3 both decisions—player 1’s to independently take
action A or not, and player 2’s to accept or reject—are crowded into the last time possible,
time T, and hence are simultaneous. Equilibrium outcome 3A of Model 3 is the same as the
equilibrium of Model 2, and equilibrium outcome 3B is the same as in Model 1. Equilibrium
3B, however, is made up of strategies that are weakly dominated for both players. Under
3This is exactly the sort of situation studied by Ayres and Madison (1999), who discuss settings where
parties threaten ineﬃcient performance in order to enhance their bargaining power. Note that these authors
do recognize that threats must be credible in the sense that the player making the threat is at least weakly
better oﬀ if the threat is carried out.
4Matters are more complicated if there is a chance the suicide bomber obtains positive net utility from
the explosion. We discuss the eﬀects of incomplete information in Section 5 below.Lyon and Rasmusen 10
no conditions does Player 1 do better by not authorizing A in Move 3 than by authorizing.
He does worse by not authorizing if Player 2 rejects the contract. Under no conditions does
Player 2 do better by accepting the (1,0) split than by rejecting. He does worse if player 1
authorizes A in move 3. Hence, we view Model 2 as the most appropriate way to represent
the Basic Game.
We will show in the next section that acceptance of Model 1 implies acceptance of
perverse conclusions in a variety of models commonly used in economics, and that the Axiom
rules out these perverse results. Here, however, it may be useful to show the Axiom’s radical
implications in one inﬂuential context: the “mechanism design with ex post renegotiation”
framework proposed by Maskin and Moore (1999).
Maskin and Moore (1999) use the following example to motivate their analysis. Two
agents are aﬀected by whether action a, b, or c is chosen in state of the world θ or φ. We
wish to ﬁnd a mechanism that implements action a in state θ and b in state φ. Agent 1’s
preferences from worst to best are (b,c,a). Agent 2’s preferences from worst to best are
(b,a,c) in state θ and (c,a,b) in state φ. Thus, if no renegotiation is possible, a mechanism
that achieves (θ : a,φ : b) is to simply let Agent 2 choose between a and b.
But suppose we allow renegotiation. Assume that Agent 2 has control of the mechanism
and has all the bargaining power. Maskin and Moore say that Agent 2 would then choose
b in state θ, even though that is Pareto-dominated by a. The reason is that he would then
make Agent 1 a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to renegotiate to c, and Agent 1 would accept. Thus,
the buyer-option mechanism would fail to attain the desired result.
That story violates our Axiom of Unilateral Action. If the mechanism says that Agent
2 may revise his choice at any time until it would be too late to reverse the decision, then
Agent 2’s choice of b would not be a credible threat point. If Agent 1 refused to renegotiate
in state θ, Agent 2 would back down and switch his choice to a. Thus, a small revision to
the mechanism– perhaps better termed a clariﬁcation–can achieve the ﬁrst best.
3 LEGAL EXTORTION: NUISANCE SUITS AND THREATS OF INEFFI-
CIENT PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS
We will now explore the implications of the superiority of Model 2 in various economic
and legal applications. In this section, we consider two legal settings in which one party
may have incentives to threaten ineﬃcient actions in order to extort payments from the
other party. First, we discuss nuisance suits, as an example in which Model 2 reaches the
result generally accepted by economists. Second, we examine the choice between injunctions
and money damages as contractual remedies, which illustrates how legal rules determineLyon and Rasmusen 11
whether extortionary threats are credible. That done, we proceed in Section 4 to the more
complicated situations of contracting with investment and possible renegotiation.
3.1 NUISANCE SUITS
We now present a simple model of nuisance suits in which we believe there will be no
controversy over whether Model 2 is the most appropriate choice. In a nuisance suit, the
plaintiﬀ is suing the defendant in a case which has no probability of success if it goes to
trial, provided that the defendant does pay to defend himself at trial. The plaintiﬀ’s only
motivation is to induce the defendant to agree to a settlement oﬀer and avoid the defense
costs. In this case, the “Action A” of the Basic Game consists of dropping the lawsuit,
which creates a surplus consisting of the avoided trial costs.
We will assume that the plaintiﬀ has all the bargaining power. The sequence of events
is:
1. Plaintiﬀ sues Defendant.
2. Plaintiﬀ makes a settlement oﬀer to Defendant, in exchange for which Plaintiﬀ agrees
to drop the suit.
3. If the suit goes to trial, the plaintiﬀ incurs costs of P and defendant incurs costs of
D. The suit has zero probability of success, so no damages are paid.
If we accept the logic of Model 1, then Plaintiﬀ can extract a payment of up to D from
defendant by making the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, “Accept a zero share of the surplus of
P + D from avoiding trial, or go to trial.” In contrast, the logic of Model 2 implies that
division of the surplus is a separate issue from whether the action of dropping the suit will
be taken, as a result of which the plaintiﬀ will drop the suit if defendant refuses to pay
extortion money.
In this stark setting, nuisance suits are not part of any reasonable equilibrium. The lit-
erature on nuisance suits takes the lack of nuisance suits in this simple model as its starting
point, recognizing that a model needs additional features to generate credible threats and
successful extortion. The literature considers a number of more sophisticated situations,
and ﬁnds that nuisance suits can indeed emerge in equilibrium if, for example, there exists
incomplete information about the plaintiﬀ’s “type, ” or if courts make predictable mistakes
( For a survey, see Rasmusen [1998]). But in this simple model, Model 2 is the appropri-
ate representation, because the Plaintiﬀ’s threat to impose the costs of D and P on the
defendant and himself is not credible.Lyon and Rasmusen 12
3.2 SUCCESSFUL EXTORTION BASED ON COMMITMENT TO A LEGAL
REMEDY
People do use the courts for extortion, but the extortionist’s threat must be to do some-
thing which beneﬁts himself, or it will not be credible. Judge Richard Posner, for example,
has declined to grant an injunction for speciﬁc performance of a contract, explaining that
“Probably, therefore, [the seller] is seeking speciﬁc performance in order to have bargaining
leverage with [the buyer], and we can think of no reason why the law should give it such
leverage.”(Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 279-80
(7th Cir. 1986)). Although this case shows that extortion may fail because of an alert
judge, it suggests that extortion can be credible enough that courts must worry about it.
Ayres and Madison (1999) analyze the kind of situation facing Judge Posner and further
illustrate what happens in our Basic Game. Ayres and Madison’s point of departure is an
example based on Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co. 382 P. 2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
Suppose a miner has contracted to return the topsoil on a farmer’s strip-mined land to
its original position. The cost of moving the topsoil turns out to be $30,000, even though
the market value of the land would only rise by $10,000 once the soil was returned. The
farmer’s gain from having the topsoil returned is not $10,000, however, but only $8,000,
because he intends to keep living on the land rather than selling it. If the miner refuses
to return the topsoil, the farmer can go to court and, we assume for the example, request
either speciﬁc performance (the return of the soil) or money damages (the $10,000 loss in
market value).
The farmer has a strategic rationale for seeking speciﬁc performance, even though its
beneﬁt of $8,000 is less than the beneﬁt of $10,000 from money damages. That is because
the farmer would use his option to enforce the court’s injunction as a bargaining chip to
extract cash from the miner.
In terms of the Basic Game, Action A is the opportunistic farmer’s choice to drop the
request for speciﬁc performance. This would be eﬃcient since enforcement of the injunction
would cost the miner $30,000 and only beneﬁt the farmer by $8,000. Dropping the injunction
would increase joint surplus by $22,000. Under the Nash bargaining solution where the
parties split the surplus, each party would gain $11,000 from the bargain. The miner’s
payment must also compensate the farmer for his $8,000 in lost value from dropping the
injunction, so the total payment from the miner would be $19,000. This is what we expect
the farmer to demand in return for dropping the injunction.
Can the miner expect the farmer unilaterally to take Action A and drop the request if
the miner refuses to pay $19,000? No–the farmer is better oﬀ getting the $8,000 beneﬁtLyon and Rasmusen 13
from speciﬁc performance than getting nothing. At this point, it is too late for the farmer
to go back to court and ask for money damages instead, even though they would be greater;
the law does not permit cases to be re-opened in this way. Thus, this example shows how an
ineﬃcient threat can be made credible by appropriately foreclosing the alternative option,
money damages.
The example would turn out diﬀerently under a legal regime in which farmer had to
seek money damages if the miner were to ﬂout the injunction instead of asking the court
to declare the miner in contempt and jail him until he complied. In this case, the farmer’s
threat to enforce the injunction would not be credible. The miner would know that the
farmer would prefer the $10,000 money damages from the ﬂouted injunction to the $8,000
from returning the soil.
The situation would not have arisen if the law had said that the farmer could only seek
money damages (which is, indeed, the usual rule in contract law). Such a rule would protect
the miner from extortion if the cost of returning the soil turned out to be unexpectedly high.
Or, if the law allowed the parties to declare the remedy in advance in the contract, they
would choose money damages to avoid exortion.
Ayres and Madison also mention the classic enroachment case of Pile v. Pedrick, 31 A.
646 (Pa. 1895). Pedrick built a factory wall with a foundation that mistakenly enroached
onto Pile’s land by about an inch. This is a case of property law, not contract law, so the
common law does allow a court to require speciﬁc performance. The court oﬀered Pile a
choice of either money damages (which would be small) or a court order that Pedrick remove
the wall (which would be very expensive for Pedrick). Pile asked for the court order. Pile’s
threat to enforce the court order was then credible; once he had made his choice, Pile no
longer had the option of money damages. He did have the option to sell Pedrick the court
order, however, and no doubt that is what he did.
These cases show how rigidities in the legal system can create opportunities for indi-
viduals to use ineﬃcient threats for extortionary purposes. In both the cases discussed
above, the legal rules violate our Axiom of Unilateral Action, and render ineﬃcient threats
credible. The cases underline how important it is for parties to be able to choose eﬃcient
clauses in a contract. In Pile v. Pedrick there was no contract: the interaction between the
two parties was involuntary, so they had to rely on default legal rules, and those default
rules were the ones for property, not contract. In the Peevyhouse example, however, if the
law had allowed the parties to choose the enforcement rule in their contract they would
have chosen money damages and the result would be eﬃcient. In our next section, we will
show the value of free contracting in avoiding the hold-up problem in investment.Lyon and Rasmusen 14
4. TWO MODELS OF INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
This section presents simpliﬁed versions of two prominent models that aim to show the
ineﬀectiveness of contracting in certain settings with hold-up potential, i.e. that try to
provide foundations for contractual incompleteness. We show how they relate to our Basic
Game and illustrate the implications of the three modeling scenarios we discussed in Section
2. We conclude that the use of buyer-option contracts overcomes the contracting problems
considered in these papers. As a result, we call into question whether the hold-up problem
can explain contractual incompleteness in the ways it has so far been formally modelled.
Throughout this section, we will assume that Buyer, the opportunistic player, has all
the bargaining power, in that he has the ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. However,
he also has a unilateral option that controls the trade decision. As in the Basic Game, we
assume that one player— the Buyer— possesses the option up until time T. In Section 4.1,
the option— action A—will be whether to accept delivery of the good; in Section 4.2, the
option is to require Seller to deliver the eﬃcient product variant or a diﬀerent one.
4.1 THE CHE-HAUSCH MODEL OF COOPERATIVE INVESTMENT
Let us analyze a simpliﬁed version of the model of Che and Hausch (1999), who consider
a situation of bilateral monopoly in which both parties can make investments. Their paper
derives suﬃcient conditions for contracting to be worthless when renegotiation cannot be
prevented. One such condition is that investments by the two parties are supermodular (i.e.
have marginal social values that increase with the other party’s investment) and suﬃciently
cooperative (i.e. they primarily provide a direct beneﬁt to the other party.5 Perhaps the
most natural example of cooperative investment is an investment by the seller that improves
the quality of the product provided. Alternative suﬃcient conditions for contracting to be
worthless are that only one party invests and the investment is purely cooperative, which
is the situation in the model we will analyze here.
In the model, Seller is to provide a good to Buyer, and can invest e to improve the
quality of the good. Once the investment has been made, production costs Seller a ﬁxed
amount c. Buyer obtains value V (e) from the good, with V 0(e) > 0. The investment is thus
what Che and Hausch term a purely “cooperative” investment, since it directly improves
the payoﬀ of the other player (the term “cross investment” has also been used for this).
Buyer has all the bargaining power.
The sequence of moves is as follows:
5For a model that more extensively looks at diﬀerent kinds of “cross- investments” in which one player’s
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1. Buyer oﬀers Seller a “buyer option” contract of the following form. Seller pays Buyer
a ﬁxed fee F upon signing the contract and produces the good. Buyer, on observing
the quality of the good, decides whether to accept delivery at any time up to time T;
If Buyer accepts delivery, Seller is paid P∗.
2. Seller accepts or rejects the contract.
3. Seller invests e.
4. Buyer decides whether to accept delivery or not. If he accepts delivery, Buyer pays
P∗ to Seller and Seller incurs c in production cost.
5. If Buyer refuses delivery, then renegotiation can occur, i.e. Buyer can make a take-
it-or-leave-it oﬀer to Seller.
6. Seller decides whether to accept or reject the new oﬀer.
7. If we follow Model 1, the game ends. If we follow Model 2, Buyer again decides
whether to accept delivery, subject to any contract modiﬁcations mutually agreed
upon in stages 5 and 6.
In this model, Action A is acceptance of delivery. The socially optimal investment
maximizes V (e) − e, which requires V 0(e∗) = 1. If renegotiation could be prevented, then
this level of investment could be implemented simply by setting P∗ = V (e∗). Assuming
trade is valuable, Buyer would accept delivery if e = e∗ and Seller would be willing to make
the investment. Surplus can be divided between the two parties by an appropriate selection
of the ﬁxed fee F ∈ (0,V (e∗) − e∗ − c). Since Buyer has all the bargaining power, he will
make an oﬀer of F = V (e∗) − e∗ − c, which will leave the Seller indiﬀerent about accepting
the contract.
When renegotiation is possible, Model 1 implies the contract will result in extortion:
even if e ≥ e∗, Buyer will refuse delivery in stage 4. Then in stage 5 Buyer will make a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer of P = c. Anticipating this, Seller expects to only to recover his
production cost, c, for the good and will not invest. He chooses e = 0.
Model 2, however, leads to a very diﬀerent outcome. Suppose Buyer refuses delivery at
stage 4, and then at stage 5 oﬀers Seller price P = c in exchange for agreeing to delivery.
What will happen if Seller now rejects Buyer’s oﬀer? Buyer’s initial message was that Seller
should not deliver the good. In Model 2, however, Buyer will “change his mind” and accept
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T.6 As a result, Seller is willing to invest in product quality, and the optimal investment
can be achieved by setting P∗ = V (e∗).
Is it reasonable to assume that the contract can specify that the Buyer can decide
whether to accept delivery up until time T, rather than being bound by an earlier refusal
of delivery? This is equivalent to including in the contract the instructions that even if
Buyer initially signs a document that says “I refuse delivery, ” he can unilaterally replace
it up until time T with a document that says “I accept delivery according to the original
contract terms if Seller has not delivered to you a document, with both our signatures on
it, agreeing to revised terms.” Such a clause is well deﬁned and easy to write, and neither
party would have any reason to object to it.
4.2 THE HART-MOORE MODEL OF PRODUCT COMPLEXITY
Hart and Moore (1999) present a model of a buyer and seller who are contracting for
production and delivery of a “special” widget.7 They consider an environment in which it
is impossible to know in advance which of N possible widgets will be desired, i.e. “special.”
They argue that as N goes to inﬁnity, the value of writing a contract goes to zero. In this
section, we discuss a variant of Hart and Moore’s formulation in which the parties use a
buyer-option contract.8
At the outset of the game, Buyer and Seller sign a contract. After the contract is signed,
Seller invests σ in cost reduction. With probability π(σ), the cost of the special widget is
cL, and otherwise it is the greater amount cH. Buyer’s value for the special widget is v,
which is greater than cH. There are also N − 1 generic widgets that might be produced,
which have positive but trivial value for Buyer. Generic widget n has production cost
gn = cL+(n/N)(cH −cL), so the generic widget costs are spread evenly between cL and cH.
The problem for Buyer and Seller is that by assumption the contract cannot specify either
Seller’s investment σ or that the widget delivered be the special widget. Furthermore, it is
only after Seller has invested in cost reduction that the parties learn which widget is the
6One might think there would be an equilibrium in which Buyer was willing to refuse delivery because
he is indiﬀerent between accepting a good of quality V (e
∗) at price P
∗ and refusing it, and that as a
result, Buyer’s threat not to accept delivery would be credible. Such an equilibrium does not exist. If Seller
anticipated that Buyer would refuse delivery when indiﬀerent, Seller would choose e = e
∗+, for  arbitrarily
small, so as to make Buyer strictly better oﬀ accepting delivery than rejecting.
7Their model is based on Segal (1999), but uses a speciﬁcation that is much simpler to analyze.
8Hart and Moore (1999) point out that the somewhat unusual production process in their model avoids
the criticisms of similar models raised by Maskin and Tirole (1999), or, less technically, Maskin (2002). Our
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special one; earlier, the best they can do is identify speciﬁc widgets by, say, color.9 Thus,
the initial contract could say, “Deliver the red widget,” but it could not say, “Deliver the
special widget.” Even after the parties learn which widget is the special one, they cannot
verify this in court.
We will assume that the buyer has all the bargaining power, e.g., the buyer can make
the seller a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. The sequence of events is as follows.
1. Buyer oﬀers Seller a buyer-option contract that grants Buyer the right ex post to
specify the widget to be delivered at any time up to T, and pays Seller amount F
immediately (where F could be negative).
2. Seller accepts or rejects the contract.
3. Seller invests σ in cost reduction, and the probability the cost of the special widget is
cL instead of cH is π(σ).
4. The identity of the special widget is revealed to the parties.
5. Buyer speciﬁes a widget to be delivered.
6. Renegotiation can occur, i.e. Buyer can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to Seller.
7. Seller decides whether to accept or reject the new oﬀer.
8. If we follow Model 1, the game ends. If we follow Model 2, Buyer may specify a
diﬀerent widget to be delivered, subject to any contract modiﬁcations mutually agreed
upon in stages 5 and 6.
In this model, Action A is Buyer’s speciﬁcation that he wants the special widget to be
delivered. In the absence of a contract (under the “null contract”), Seller would choose
investment level σ = 0 and the two players would agree on a price of p = cL or p = cH,
depending on the cost of the special widget. Buyer would be allowed to choose which
widget he wanted, or, equivalently, to refuse delivery if he did not like the widget that Seller
presented to him. Buyer would choose the special widget. This would be the equilibrium
because Seller gains nothing by deviating to positive investment. In the bargaining over the
price, Buyer will pay him no more than cost anyway, so there is no point in Seller trying to
reduce the cost.
9Hart and Moore (1999) also consider a case where even the color of the widget cannot be described in
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If, contrary to the assumptions, it were possible to include Seller’s investment amount
and the cost and identity of the widget in the contract, the ﬁrst-best can be achieved. Buyer
and Seller would agree to a price of cL or cH for the special widget, depending on its cost,
with a requirement that Seller choose the ﬁrst-best investment level, σ∗, and an upfront
payment from Buyer to Seller of F = σ∗.
If the investment amount of widget identity cannot be speciﬁed in the contract but,
contrary to the assumptions, renegotiation is not possible, the ﬁrst-best can still be achieved.
Buyer and Seller would agree to a price of zero for whichever widget the Buyer picks and
an upfront payment from Buyer to Seller of F = σ∗ + π(σ∗)cL + (1 − π(σ∗))cH, enough to
cover both the ﬁrst-best investment cost and the expected production cost for th special
widget. Seller would ﬁnd it in his self-interest to set σ = σ∗ and Buyer would ﬁnd it in his
interest to choose the special widget for delivery.
Under the actual assumptions of the model, however, Hart and Moore argue that a
contract can accomplish little. The best a contract can do is to specify in advance that one
of the widgets (say, the red one) is to be delivered at a ﬁxed price, say P0. If in fact the red
widget is the special widget, then the contract is performed as written. If not, the parties
renegotiate so that the special widget is delivered. Because Buyer has all the bargaining
power, Seller earns a zero share of the incremental surplus that is created by renegotiating
from the undesired red widget to the special widget. Since he does not beneﬁt from the
cost of the special widget being low unless the red widget is the special widget, Seller has
ineﬃciently low incentives to invest in cost reduction. He fails to capture the full beneﬁts
of his investment; indeed, he captures only a share 1/N of those beneﬁts, so as N goes to
inﬁnity, his share goes to zero. As a result, his investment goes to zero, as well, and the
null contract is as good as any other contract.
Hart and Moore implicitly use Model 1 as the framework for their analysis. Buyer will
not immediately select the special widget. Rather, if the special widget happens to have the
low cost of cL, Buyer will initially select the most costly generic widget– the “gold-plated”
widget– which has cost cH in the limit as N goes to inﬁnity. He then extorts a payment
from Seller in exchange for allowing Seller not to deliver the costly generic widget. Thus,
under Model 1, when renegotiation cannot be prevented, contracting becomes valueless.
Applying Model 2 leads to very diﬀerent conclusions. It implies that Buyer’s extortion
threat is not credible. Suppose the contract speciﬁes delivery of the Buyer’s choice of
widget at price P0, and that the special widget turns out to be the cheapest to produce.
Seller would make P0 − cL if Buyer were to nominate the special widget. Suppose instead
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Seller a renegotiated price of P1 = P0−(cH −cL), leaving Seller with payoﬀ P0−cH. What
happens if Seller rejects the oﬀer? The contract requires delivery of the costly but worthless
gold-plated widget. In Model 2, Buyer takes action A and “changes his mind,” ordering
the special widget at time T. Thus, in Model 2, Buyer will specify the special widget and
Seller will deliver it. Using Model 2, the simple “buyer option” contract is ﬁrst best, even
in a complex environment where it is impossible to determine ex ante which widget will be
special ex post.10
The incomplete contracting papers we have re-examined in this section share the com-
mon structure of mechanism design models with ex post renegotiation. In both the Che-
Hausch and the Hart-Moore models, the ﬁrst-best could be achieved were the parties able
to commit not to renegotiate. The possibility of renegotiation makes it impossible for the
parties to recover the full marginal value of their investments, and hence underinvestment
occurs. Furthermore, in both sections, the value of contracting goes to zero as certain
parameters of the model go to their extremes.
We have argued that mechanisms with renegotiation are fundamentally changed when
one contractual party has an option, i.e. can unilaterally determine the outcome of the
mechanism. In eﬀect, the ability of this party to unilaterally “change his mind” if the
other party rejects a renegotiation overture undermines the option-holder’s threat to be
opportunistic, and restores commitment to the original contract terms.
5 LIMITS TO THE USE OF BUYER-OPTION CONTRACTS
We have argued that buyer-option contracts can be powerful tools for alleviating hold-up
problems. Nevertheless, such contracts are not a panacea. In particular, information prob-
lems threaten the eﬃciency of option contracts. For example, Edlin and Hermalin (2000)
consider a model similar to that of Che and Hausch (1999) in which the trading opportunity
is of unlimited duration. They argue the buyer then has incentives to delay exercising an
option until it either expires or is “out of the money,” i.e., ﬁnancially unattractive for the
10Watson (2003) presents a numerical example (his “Example 3”) intended to show that in the Hart-Moore
model with ex post renegotiation, there exist settings in which contracts cannot implement the ﬁrst best.
His example does not violate our Axiom of Unilateral Action, but it is diﬀerent from the Hart-Moore model
because the source of ineﬃciency is not renegotiation. In Watson’s example, the seller’s investment does not
simply reduce costs, but also generates an extremely high payoﬀ to the buyer from making a suboptimal trade
decision. This structure has the beneﬁt of rendering credible the buyer’s threat to take an ineﬃcient action.
The diﬀerence from Hart and Moore is that the problem is not renegotiation. Even when renegotiation is
ruled out by assumption, no contract could induce a high level of investment in the Watson example. It
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buyer, at which point the buyer can engage in opportunistic renegotiation. However, they
implicitly assume it is impossible to index the option’s strike price to changing economic
conditions, although the empirical literature provides numerous examples of successful price
adjustment provisions in contracts.11
More serious are situations of incomplete information. Let us see what happens when
we extend section 4.2’s Hart-Moore model of product complexity to allow the seller to be
uncertain about the buyer’s preferences.
We have already seen that because of the diﬃculty of describing the product to be
produced while giving the seller the proper incentives for investment, it is desirable to use
a buyer option contract, allowing the buyer to refuse delivery if he is dissatisﬁed with the
product. The real world does have such contracts, but under incomplete information they
make the seller vulnerable to a diﬀerent kind of manipulation than the problem Hart and
Moore describe. What if the buyer tells the seller, after the contract is signed, that he wants
a product that is very expensive to produce? That does happen with some probability in
the Hart and Moore model, because the special widget may turn out to be expensive.
Information is complete and symmetric, however, so in their model the contract price is
high enough that on average the seller can break even, and the buyer is willing to pay that
high price because he knows he might end up wanting a widget that is expensive to produce.
Suppose, however, that information were incomplete and asymmetric, so the buyer knew
in advance whether he wanted an expensive widget, but the seller did not know whether
he faced a buyer with that kind of expensive taste. All buyers would pretend to have
inexpensive tastes, the seller would charge a price high enough to cover the probability of
having to deliver to both kinds of buyers, and buyers with inexpensive tastes would decide
not to buy. This adverse selection could result in the market breaking down completely.
The buyer-option contract makes it a lemons market even though adverse selection was
not originally a problem. As a result, the buyer and seller would abandon buyer-option
contracts and instead use some inferior contract such as the null contract that does not
leave the seller vulnerable to buyers with expensive tastes.
Formalization of this idea will make it clearer. Let us add the following wrinkle to the
Hart-Moore model. With probability θ, the buyer is “normal”: his favorite widget is the
special widget, with a value of v and a production cost of either cL or cH. With probability
(1 − θ), however, he is “ﬁnicky” and his favorite widget is a “superspecial” widget that he
values at ˜ v > v and which costs a ﬁxed ˜ c to produce. At the time of contracting, the buyer’s
11For example, Joskow (1990) studies price adjustment clauses in coal contracts, emphasizing how few price
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type is known to the buyer but not to the seller. As before, we assume that the buyer has
all the bargaining power in the sense that he can make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers in contract
negotiations. We will allow either ˜ v > ˜ c, or the opposite, in which case no trade should take
place unless the buyer is normal. Crucially, assume that the superspecial widget’s cost is
very high relative to the value of the special widget:
v < θcL + (1 − θ)˜ c.
The null contract works much as before: the seller will choose zero investment in cost
reduction. Once the cost of the special widget is known, the normal buyer will oﬀer to buy
the special widget at a price equal to its cost, either cL or cH. The ﬁnicky buyer will either
oﬀer to buy the special widget at its cost, if the cost is cL and (˜ v − ˜ c) < v − cL or the cost
is cH and (˜ v − ˜ c) < v − cH, or the superspecial widget at its cost of ˜ c otherwise.
In the original model, with complete information, the buyer-option contract speciﬁed
that the buyer pay the seller σ∗ plus the price p = π(σ∗)cL + (1 − π(σ∗))cH up front, and
that the buyer choose which widget was to be delivered. Under that contract, the seller’s
proﬁts would now be negative for large enough ˜ c, because with probability (1−θ) the buyer
will be ﬁnicky and choose the superspecial widget regardless of its cost. For the seller’s
expected proﬁt to equal zero, a pooling contract, oﬀered by both types of buyers, must
have a price p such that
p ≥ θcL + (1 − θ)˜ c.
This, however, is impossible under our cost assumption, because v < p and the buyer
would prefer no contract at all. A buyer-option contract must therefore contain a price so
high that only ﬁnicky buyers choose it—a price of p = ˜ c. Even the ﬁnicky buyers will ﬁnd
this no better than the null contract, and possibly worse (depending on the parameters and
the special widget’s realized cost). The buyer-option contract now fails as a solution to the
problem of unveriﬁable product quality.
This model illustrates how incomplete information can exacerbate the hold-up problem
by destroying the feasibility of buyer-option contracts. In such a setting, the parties must
resort to other contractual arrangements that fail to support ﬁrst-best levels of investment.
The basic intuition of Hart and Moore (1999) is restored, but only because of the incomplete
information.
6 CONCLUSION
The timing of moves and the details of the particular setting are critical when one party
can take a unilateral action. This general point has been made before, e.g. by SuttonLyon and Rasmusen 22
(1986) in the context of bargaining theory and by Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) in
the context of contract theory. Nevertheless, its implications are sometimes forgotten. In
mechanism design models, in particular, a unilateral threat is sometimes taken to represent
the outcome of a mechanism that sets the status quo point for subsequent renegotiation. We
argue that such a modeling structure grants too much commitment power to the unilateral
actor. Instead we advocate a modeling approach that treats the unilateral threat as an
outside option that must improve the actor’s payoﬀs if it is to be credible.
Our approach leads to radically diﬀerent—and, we believe, more reasonable—outcomes
in received economic models of nuisance suits and incomplete contracting. This is particu-
larly important in hold-up models, where our approach implies a substantially smaller scope
for hold-up than does the mechanism design approach. Indeed, we have seen that in models
of the foundations of incomplete contracts, the ﬁrst- best can be achieved through the use
of buyer-option contracts.
We would like to see future work on contracts reﬂect a closer connection between theory
and empirics in the style of, for example, MacLeod and Malcomson (1993). There is a
large empirical literature on contracts grounded in the perspective of Williamson (1985),
but additional work is needed to test the implications of alternative formal theories of con-
tract. Our analysis suggests that buyer-option contracts ought to be observed empirically
in settings with complex products or cooperative investments where the contracting parties
have good information about one another. Where the parties possess incomplete informa-
tion about each other, however, buyer-option contracts should be less prevalent. From the
perspective of theory, there is a need for work that is grounded in the realities of contract.
As we showed in section 3, legal rules can have strong implications for which ineﬃcient
threats are credible in particular settings. In addition, most information is neither cost-
lessly veriﬁable nor fully non-veriﬁable; instead, information can be veriﬁed with increasing
precision as more resources are lavished on veriﬁcation. Similarly, renegotiation is neither
instantaneous nor costless; accepting this reality may lead to extensive-form models that
better reﬂect the type of contracts we see in use, as illustrated by Lyon and Huang (2002),
Rasmusen (2001b), and Schwartz and Watson (2000).
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